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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
David W. Covell and Margaret Covell, who are plenary 
guardians of their adult son David F. Covell, appeal from a 
jury’s verdict for the defendant in their products liability suit 
against Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. They urge us to order a new 
trial on the ground that the District Court erred by admitting 
evidence and charging the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts (1998), rather than section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Having 
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held in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38 
(3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 553 (2009), that federal 
district courts applying Pennsylvania law to products liability 
cases should look to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, and seeing no reason to reverse course now, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
David F. Covell, a 36 year-old schoolteacher, sustained 
serious brain injuries when he was struck by a car while 
bicycling to work in 2007. Tragically, he is now so disabled 
that his parents (the “Covells”) have been appointed his legal 
guardians. In that capacity, they filed this products liability suit 
against Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. (“Bell”), which manufactured 
the “Giro Monza” bicycle helmet their son wore during the 
collision. Their suit, filed in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas, alleged that the Giro Monza helmet was 
defectively designed and that it lacked adequate warnings 
about danger from impact to the helmet’s edge. Bell removed 
the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, where the trial proceeded according 
to Pennsylvania substantive law. 
 
At trial, and over the Covells’ strident objections, the 
District Court permitted Bell to introduce expert testimony that 
was based in part upon the United States Consumer Product 
Safety Commission’s Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets 
(the “CPSC Standard”). The CPSC Standard is an 
administrative regulation that provides an exacting set of 
guidelines for impact resistance, head covering, labels on 
helmets and helmet boxes, helmet resistance to temperature 
and moisture, manufacturer recordkeeping, and much more. 
5 
See 16 C.F.R. § 1203. Forced to respond to Bell’s expert, the 
Covells offered their own expert testimony regarding the 
CPSC Standard. Ultimately, experts for both sides agreed that 
the CPSC Standard forms the starting point for any bicycle 
helmet design, and that the Giro Monza helmet satisfied the 
CPSC Standard in all respects. 
 
At the trial’s conclusion, the District Court instructed 
the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts. The Court also instructed the jury that, in determining 
whether the Giro Monza helmet was or was not defective, it 
could consider evidence of standards or customs in the bicycle 
helmet industry, including the CPSC Standard. The jury 
returned a verdict for the defense, finding that the helmet was 
not defective. The Covells timely filed this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We review issues of law de novo. Bear Mt. Orchards, 
Inc. v. Mich-Kim, Inc., 623 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2010). This 
includes a District Court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence pursuant to Pennsylvania law. Dillinger v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 434-435 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
III. 
 
The Covells call to our attention two assignments of 
error. First, they contend that the District Court should not 
have applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts when instructing 
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the jury and when admitting evidence of the CPSC Standard. 
Second, they contend that even if it was proper to apply the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, the CPSC Standard was 
nonetheless inadmissible. We disagree and will affirm the 
District Court on both counts. 
 
A. 
 
We begin with the District Court’s decisions to admit 
evidence and to instruct the jury pursuant to the Restatement 
(Third) and not the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We note at 
the outset that the question the Covells present—what is the 
law of Pennsylvania: section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, or sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts?—is one we laid to rest only 24 months ago in 
Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 40 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that if confronted with the question, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 and 2 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability cases), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 553 (2009). After examining the 
contentions of the parties and the recent decisions of 
Pennsylvania’s highest court, we conclude that the state of the 
law is no different now than it was when we decided Berrier. 
Rather than exhume the arguments and considerations we laid 
to rest there, we will apply stare decisis. 
 
1. 
 
In past products liability cases, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has looked to section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. E.g., Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 
1966) (“We hereby adopt the foregoing language [of § 402A] 
as the law of Pennsylvania.”). Section 402A makes sellers 
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liable for harm caused to consumers by unreasonably 
dangerous products, even if the seller exercised reasonable 
care: 
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property, if 
 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care 
in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Section 402A 
thus creates a strict liability regime by insulating products 
liability cases from negligence concepts. See id. § 402A(2)(a); 
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1025-1026 (Pa. 
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1978) (charging courts to avoid negligence concepts when 
instructing a jury pursuant to § 402A.). 
 
During the past 40 years, however, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania has repeatedly addressed confusion arising 
from a core conflict in the structure of section 402A itself: 
Section 402A instructs courts to ignore evidence that the seller 
“exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product,” § 402A(2)(a), yet imposes liability only for products 
that are “unreasonably dangerous,” § 402A(1). In many cases 
it is difficult or impossible to determine whether a product is 
“unreasonably dangerous” to consumers without reference to 
evidence that the seller did or did not exercise “care in the 
preparation” of the product. See Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 
A.3d 924, 940 (Pa. 2011) (“This 
no-negligence-in-strict-liability rubric has resulted in material 
ambiguities and inconsistency in Pennsylvania’s procedure.”); 
see also Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 
1015-1016 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 
endeavored to segregate strict liability’s “product-oriented” 
analysis from the “conduct-oriented” analysis of negligence. 
Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1006 (“[W]e have remained steadfast in 
our proclamations that negligence concepts should not be 
imported into strict liability law . . .”). In so doing, 
Pennsylvania’s high court has stated repeatedly that 
negligence concepts have no place in products liability. E.g., 
id.; Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-1026. That endeavor has not 
always been successful, see Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 
186, 190 (Pa. 1997) (holding that if a “product has reached the 
user or consumer with substantial change,” liability depends 
upon “whether the manufacturer could have reasonably 
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expected or foreseen such an alteration of its product.”) 
(emphasis added), nor has it been uniformly embraced by the 
Justices of that Court, see Schmidt, 11 A.3d at 940 
(disapproving of Pennsylvania’s “almost unfathomable 
approach to products litigation”) (quotation omitted). 
The American Law Institute responded to the core 
conflict in section 402A when it published the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts abandon entirely the negligence-versus-strict-liability 
distinction that has caused so much trouble in Pennsylvania: 
 
§ 1:  Liability of Commercial Seller or 
Distributor for Harm Caused by 
Defective Products 
 
One engaged in the business of selling or 
otherwise distributing products who sells or 
distributes a defective product is subject to 
liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the defect. 
 
§ 2: Categories of Product Defect 
 
A product is defective when, at the time of 
sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in 
design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings. A 
product: 
 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when 
the product departs from its intended 
design even though all possible care 
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was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product; 
 
(b) is defective in design when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other 
distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the alternative design 
renders the product not reasonably safe; 
 
(c) is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable 
instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe. 
 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 1-2 (1998). 
 
Section 1 thus makes sellers liable only for the sale of 
products that are “defective,” and section 2 provides that a 
product may qualify as “defective” if it meets one of three sets 
of criteria. The criteria—which incorporate negligence 
concepts such as “foreseeable risk” and “care” directly into the 
definition of “defective”—amount to an express rejection of 
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the “no negligence in products liability” regime that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has endorsed in cases like 
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-1026. Several Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have expressed the view that 
section 402A’s approach is antiquated and should be replaced. 
See, e.g., Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1015-1016 (Saylor, J., Castille, 
J., & Eakin, J., concurring) (“I believe that the time has come 
for this Court, in the manner of so many other jurisdictions, to 
expressly recognize the essential role of risk-utility balancing, 
a concept derived from negligence doctrine, in design defect 
litigation.”). Whether or when that Court will move from the 
Restatement (Second) to the Restatement (Third) of Torts are 
questions that have engendered much debate. 
 
They are also questions that have challenged this Court. 
In Berrier, we noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
had not yet answered whether bystanders could recover on 
design defect claims. This question, in turn, required us to 
determine whether products liability cases are governed by the 
Restatement (Second) or the Restatement (Third) of Torts, and 
we stated that “[i]n the absence of a controlling decision by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court applying that 
state’s substantive law must predict how Pennsylvania’s 
highest court would decide this case.” 563 F.3d at 45-46. After 
reviewing “relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, 
considered dicta, scholarly works, and . . . other reliable data,” 
id. at 46, we concluded that “if the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court were confronted with this issue, it would adopt the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, §§ 1 and 2,” id. at 40. Thus, we 
held that federal courts sitting in diversity and applying 
Pennsylvania law to products liability cases should look to 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Id. The 
precedential holding in Berrier, as set forth above, represents 
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this Court’s view of Pennsylvania’s products liability law. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court followed Berrier. In so doing it 
admitted evidence of the CPSC Standard as relevant to the 
amount of care Bell exercised, and it instructed the jury 
according to the framework set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Covells contend that these 
decisions by the District Court were erroneous, because they 
would be improper under section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. They maintain that section 402A “has been 
the law in Pennsylvania since it was adopted in Webb v. Zern, 
[220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966)]” and that “[n]o decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has changed this.” If the District 
Court had applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it would 
not have permitted Bell to admit evidence of the CPSC 
Standard (because due care is irrelevant under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts), and it would not have instructed the jury to 
consider whether the Giro Monza helmet was “unreasonably” 
dangerous (because the only relevant inquiry under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts is whether the product itself 
was defective). The Covells maintain that each of these 
decisions by the District Court violated the doctrine of Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as set forth in 
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), which requires 
federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law. 
376 U.S. at 638 (Stating that, “[t]he nub of the policy that 
underlies [Erie] is that . . . a suit by a non-resident litigant in a 
federal court instead of in a State court a block away, should 
not lead to a substantially different result.”). In short, the 
Covells’ position is that section 402A is the law of 
Pennsylvania, and that when the District Court applied the 
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Restatement (Third) of Torts it permitted Bell to illicitly 
“utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which 
could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where 
the action was filed.” Id. 
 
In response, Bell directs us to our decision in Berrier, 
563 F.3d at 40, wherein we held that if confronted with the 
issue, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) and not section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Such predictions 
by a federal court sitting in diversity are permissible absent a 
controlling decision by a state’s highest court. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Bell’s position is that the District Court in this case did not err, 
because it followed Berrier’s precedential prediction of 
Pennsylvania law. 
 
We will affirm the District Court’s application of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Much of 
the briefing from the parties, and all of the briefing from the 
amici, is devoted to which Restatement of Torts is best as a 
matter of policy, and which most logically extends the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—all of which 
are issues we waded through and resolved only two years ago 
when we decided Berrier. This means that, notwithstanding the 
volume of briefing in this case, the dispositive question we 
must answer is straightforward: do we follow Berrier? 
 
3. 
 
We will follow Berrier, and affirm the District Court. 
First, our Internal Operating Procedures instruct us to follow 
prior panels’ decisions: 
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Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict of 
Precedent. 
 
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of 
a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on 
subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel 
overrules the holding in a precedential opinion 
of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration 
is required to do so. 
 
3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2010). 
 
“Although a panel of this court is bound by, and lacks 
authority to overrule, a published decision of a prior panel, a 
panel may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening 
authority,” including intervening decisions of state law but its 
highest court. Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d. 
Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). In this vein, the Covells 
direct our attention to Bugosh v. I.U. North America, Inc., 942 
A.2d 897 (Pa. 2008), appeal dismissed as improvidently 
granted by 971 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2009). The Bugosh petitioner 
had sought a holding from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
declaring that the Restatement (Third) and not the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts reflects the law of Pennsylvania. The Court 
granted certiorari on the issue in 2008, but in 2009 dismissed 
the appeal as improvidently granted. Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228. 
The Covells urge us to hold that the dismissal of Bugosh 
indicates the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s contentment 
with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 
We will not do so. Reading the tea leaves of a certiorari 
dismissal is risky business; one could just as reasonably 
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conclude that the dismissal here indicates the Court’s approval 
of Berrier as much as it indicates its approval of section 402A. 
That is why the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has warned 
against reading between the lines of a certiorari dismissal: 
 
In the circumstance where we have accepted an 
issue by granting allowance of appeal, and this 
Court, after conducting our review of the issue, 
enters an order dismissing the appeal as having 
been improvidently granted, the effect is as 
though this Court never granted allowance of 
appeal. In other words, a dismissal as being 
improvidently granted has the exact same effect 
as if this Court had denied the petition for 
allowance of appeal (allocatur) in the first place. 
Where we dismiss an appeal as improvidently 
granted, the lower tribunal’s opinion and order 
stand as a decision of that court and this Court’s 
order has no precedential value.  
 
Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1996) 
(emphasis in original); see also Salazar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 702 
A.2d 1038, 1043 n.10 (Pa. 1997) (“[T]he fact that this court 
denied allowance of appeal . . . is no indication of our 
endorsement of the reasoning used by the Superior Court.”). 
We therefore conclude that, in light of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s directives in Tilghman and Salazar, the 
Bugosh appeal was an intervening event, but not an 
intervening “authority” sufficient to revisit our holding in 
Berrier. 
 
Given that Bugosh is of no consequence, we conclude 
that the state of the law in Pennsylvania is exactly as it was 
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when we decided Berrier. Absent a change in Pennsylvania’s 
law, we see no reason to upset our precedent. Applying 
Berrier, we hold that the District Court did not err in using the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts to guide its decisions to admit 
evidence, and to frame its jury instructions. 
 
B. 
 
The Covells’ fallback contention is that even if sections 
1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts were the law of 
Pennsylvania (i.e., even if the jury instructions in this case 
were correct), the District Court nonetheless erred by 
admitting evidence of the CPSC Standard. The Covells point 
out that the CPSC Standard is an “industry regulation” as 
described in section 4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
which—unlike sections 1 and 2—has not been cited or 
discussed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Cf. Berrier, 
563 F.3d at 40 (holding only that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts to products liability cases), The Covells 
maintain that if we affirm the District Court on this point we 
will apply section 4 before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
does so—something to be avoided in a diversity case. Cf. Van 
Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638. We conclude that we need break no 
new ground today; we will affirm the District Court without 
resort to section 4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts because 
the CPSC Standard was admissible pursuant to section 2. 
 
The Covells are correct that most jurisdictions applying 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability cases 
hold that evidence of compliance with product regulations is 
admissible to prove whether or not a product is defective. E.g., 
Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 
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518, 521 (Ga. 1997). Courts in jurisdictions that have 
incorporated the entirety of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
are free to admit such evidence under section 4, which 
provides: 
 
Noncompliance and Compliance with 
Product Safety Statutes or Regulations 
 
In connection with liability for defective design 
or inadequate instructions or warnings: 
 
(a) a product’s noncompliance with an 
applicable product safety statute or 
administrative regulation renders the product 
defective with respect to the risk sought to be 
reduced by the statute or regulation; and 
 
(b) a product’s compliance with an applicable 
product safety standard or administrative 
regulation is properly considered in 
determining whether the product is defective 
with respect to the risks sought to be reduced 
by the statute or regulation, but such 
compliance does not preclude as a matter of 
law a finding of a product defect. 
 
The District Court admitted such evidence in this case. 
It permitted Bell to demonstrate its compliance with the CPSC 
Standard, 16 C.F.R. § 1203, as evidence that its helmet was not 
“defective,” under section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts. 
 
The Covells contend that this was reversible error 
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because section 4, not section 2, of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts deals with governmental regulations, and—setting aside 
all debate over the validity of our holding in Berrier—there has 
been no indication from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
that it would apply section 4. Because section 4 is not in play, 
they contend, there was no basis upon which the District Court 
could have admitted evidence of Bell’s compliance with the 
CPSC Standard, regardless of which version of the 
Restatement it applied. For support, they rely upon Lewis v. 
Coffing Hoist Division, Duff-Norton, Co., 528 A.2d 590, 594 
(Pa. 1987), which applied section 402A and held that evidence 
of industry practice or regulation is inadmissible in products 
liability cases. The Lewis Court reasoned that to admit 
industry practice and regulation in products liability cases 
would be to “improperly [bring] into the case concepts of 
negligence law.” Id. 
 
We are not persuaded. As a threshold matter, we believe 
that to cite to Lewis is to beg the very question at issue in this 
appeal: may district courts applying Pennsylvania law to 
products liability cases admit evidence that is relevant to 
negligence-type concepts, like duty of care or forseeability? To 
rely upon Lewis (handed down in 1987, during the zenith of 
Pennsylvania’s no-negligence-in-strict-liability regime) would 
be to assume the question out of existence, because Lewis 
based its reasoning entirely upon the premise that there shall be 
no negligence in products liability. See id. No longer can a 
court assume that premise is true—see Davis, 690 A.2d at 186 
(applying certain negligence principles to products 
liability)—which means, by extension, that no longer can a 
court assume Lewis accurately reflects the law of 
Pennsylvania, cf. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 
F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Where stops the reason, there 
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stops the rule.” (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: 
Realism in Theory and Practice 217 (1962))). 
 
Whether the District Court erred in admitting evidence 
of the CPSC Standard thus depends not on pre-Berrier 
decisions like Lewis, but upon the post-Berrier legal 
framework that controls Pennsylvania products liability cases. 
In our view, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts (allowing negligence concepts), but not 
section 4 (providing for relevant industry regulation). We have 
difficulty imagining a negligence-friendly products liability 
regime that ignores compliance or non-compliance with 
pertinent state and federal regulations. At any rate, we need not 
determine whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would 
adopt section 4 because we agree with Bell that evidence of its 
compliance with the CPSC Standard was relevant to section 2 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts as applied in Berrier, and 
was admissible pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 
relevancy provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence control 
in this case because they are “arguably procedural.” See Kelly 
v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(Federal Rules of Evidence that are “arguably procedural” 
control in diversity actions, “notwithstanding Pennsylvania 
law to the contrary.”). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
“‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence,” Rule 401, and “[a]ll 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, 
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority,” Rule 402. 
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Applying this standard, we conclude that evidence of 
Bell’s compliance with the CPSC Standard was relevant to the 
jury’s inquiry because it went to at least two facts of 
consequence under section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, section 2. First, the CPSC Standard sets forth detailed 
rules for impact resistance and testing, and for labels and 
warning—both on the helmet and its sales packaging. 
Evidence that Bell complied with the CPSC Standard’s 
requirement for impact resistance testing makes it “more 
probable,” Rule 401, that “all possible care was exercised in 
the preparation and marketing of the product,” Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 2(a). Second, evidence that Bell complied 
with the CPSC Standard makes it “less probable,” Rule 401, 
that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable 
instructions or warnings,” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(c). 
Of course, such evidence was not conclusive on these points, 
but it was relevant and therefore presumptively admissible 
under the Federal Rules. 
 
Our conclusion in this respect—i.e., that industry 
standards and government regulations are relevant to facts of 
consequence in this case—is also in line with the Commentary 
to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Comment (b) 
explicitly states that industry regulations may be relevant to a 
plaintiff’s case under section 2, irrespective of section 4: 
 
Section 4, dealing with violations of statutory 
and regulatory norms, also provides an alternate 
method of establishing defect. A plaintiff is not 
required to establish the standard for design or 
warning under § 2, but merely to identify a 
21 
government-imposed standard.  
 
Id. § 2 comment (b). Further, comment (d) states that 
defendants may admit evidence of industry practice to show 
that an alternative design would not have made their product 
safer: 
 
The defendant is thus allowed to introduce 
evidence with regard to industry practice that 
bears on whether the omission of an alternative 
design rendered the product not reasonably safe. 
While such evidence is admissible, it is not 
necessarily dispositive. 
 
Id. § 2 comment (d). The commentary to section 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts thus buttresses our conclusion 
that evidence related to the CPSC Standard was properly 
admitted in this case. 
 
In sum, we conclude that we need not consider whether 
evidence of the CPSC Standard was admissible pursuant to 
section 4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts because in this 
case the evidence was admissible pursuant to section 2, as 
applied in Berrier. We will therefore affirm the District Court. 
 
* * * * * 
 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by 
the parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
